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I. T HE R ULES OF THE LEGAL P ROFESSIONAL
Rules regulating the legal profession, whether found in lawyer ethics
codes or in the substantive law of agency and fiduciary duty, are of two
types. First are rules that forbid bad conduct. Let’s call these the Bad
Conduct Rules (BCRs), although the “badness” of the conduct they describe will vary. Incompetence, 1 certain uses or disclosures of a client’s
confidential information,2 disloyalty,3 aiding client crimes or fraud,4 neglect of a client’s matter,5 certain contact with another lawyer’s client, 6
and certain failures to inform a tribunal of information 7 are examples of
actions BCRs proscribe. These rules and laws describe acts we do not
allow and which we may punish with civil or criminal liability, disqualification, loss of a fee, or professional discipline when they occur. Also, we
do not balance the evils they forbid against other social values. When an
accused client confesses to her lawyer, the lawyer will not be allowed to
argue that his unauthorized disclosure of her confidences should be excused because it led to the conviction of a guilty person or exoneration of
another person who was falsely accused.8 When a lawyer speaks to an
opposing lawyer’s client behind the opponent’s back, we won’t excuse
the transgression even if the lawyer can prove that his act enabled him to
obtain information that improved the justice of the ultimate resolution.9
Another category of rule might be called the Danger Zone Rules
(DZRs). These rules do not so much forbid bad conduct, but rather describe situations that could lead to bad conduct. Those situations com prise a danger zone that lawyers are forbidden to occupy, either at all or
without a client’s informed agreement. DZRs are of two types. One type
is matter-specific. It focuses on particular clients and matters or on particular kinds of transactions between lawyer and client. Let’s call these
Matter Danger Zone Rules (MDZRs). Conflict rules and imputed conflict
* © 1999 by Stephen Gillers. All rights reserved.
** Vice Dean and Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.
1. See MODEL R ULES OF P ROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1998) [hereinafter R ULE ].
2. See R ULE 1.6.
3. See R ULE 1.7 & cmt. 1; see also R ULE 1.3 cmt. 1.
4. See R ULE 1.2(d); R ULE 3.3(a)(2); R ULE 4.1(b).
5. See R ULE 1.3 & cmt.
6. See R ULE 4.2.
7. See R ULE 3.3.
8. See, e.g., In re Rhame, 416 N.E.2d 823, 823 (Ind. 1981).
9. See R ULE 4.3 . The Rule, of course, has no such exception and no court has recognized
one. Nor, for that matter, does it appear that anyone has ever argued for one. See, e.g., In organic Coatings, Inc. v. Falberg, 926 F. Supp. 517 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (disqualifying a plaintiff’s lawyer after he accepted a telephone call from a represented defendant).
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rules are in this category.10 A lawyer ca nnot (without informed consent)
accept a subsequent representation adverse to a former client in a su bstantially related matter because a MDZR anticipates that the work may
(though it may not) lead to abuse of the former client’s confidential information.11 Take two other examples: (1) Maybe a lawyer can fight effectively for a client who wants to change a local zoning ordinance, notwithstanding that success will reduce the value of the lawyer’s home ten
percent. But a MDZR won’t allow it, at least not without informed consent, because maybe the lawyer can’t.12 (2) Maybe a lawyer can be objective and zealous in the representation of a client who has “paid” the lawyer with the rights to his story, but a MDZR won’t allow it, not even with
informed consent, because the lawyer’s interest in exploiting the story
may skew his professional judgment.13
It is true, of course, that some MDZRs describe conduct that may be
independently harmful, in addition to creating a risk of violating a BCR.
For example, a former client who is opposed by a law firm containing a
lawyer who once represented the client on a substantially related matter,
or who is opposed by that very lawyer, may fear the misuse of her confidential information whether or not confidential information is actually
misused, a fact that the client may never be able to confirm.14 That fear
can be seen as an independent harm. 15 Less acute, but perhaps equally
real, a general awareness that la wyers or their firms may accept substantially related adverse matters may be seen to undermine public confidence in the profession.16 That loss of confidence is also an independent
harm because it will reduce the willingness of clients to speak candidly
with their lawyers–a situation to be avoided. But even when we view a
MDZR as forbidding conduct that is harmful—in itself, and not merely
because it can lead to bad conduct—still, the conduct is usually harmful
because of client or public apprehension. We credit this apprehension as
reasonable for the same reason that we have the MDZRs in the first
place–because it may lead to a breach of a BCR.
Another type of a Danger Zone Rule, the type I wish to discuss here,
focuses on the lawyer’s practice situation. Let’s call this type a Practice
Danger Zone Rule (PDZR). A PDZR says nothing about a particular
matter that a lawyer may wish to accept, or about a particular kind of
transaction between a lawyer and a client. A PDZR tells lawyers they
may not practice in certain kinds of entities or alliances because of the
danger that the practice situation itself will exert a baleful influence on
the lawyer’s conduct in matters that the lawyer would otherwise be fully
free to accept in a more traditional practice situation. In other words,
these are matters, we may pr esume, that are not forbidden to the lawyer

10. See R ULES 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, and 1.10(a).
11. See R ULE 1.9(a).
12. See R ULE 1.7(b).
13. See R ULE 1.8(d).
14. See Tekni-Plex, Inc. v. Meyner & Landis, 674 N.E.2d 663, 667 (N.Y. 1996).
15. See id.
16. This is one way to understand the prohibition against the appearance of impropriety.
See MODEL CODE OF P ROFESSIONAL R ESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (1980).
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by a BCR or a MDZR. 17 The PDZRs lock in without regard to the matters
the lawyer may be asked to handle, and need not be known when the
rules are violated. So, lawyers may not divide legal fees with a lay person,
work at a for-profit entity that is not a law firm if it resells the lawyer’s
services to third parties, or admit nonlawyers as partners or sharehol ders of a law firm.18 Each of these three practice situations is said to create
a danger irrespective of the matters on which the lawyer may work.
What is that danger? It is nothing less than the bad influence by the lay
participant.19 Or, more accurately, it is the risk of bad influence because,
surely, not all lay persons will try to tempt a la wyer to act badly, and, if
we are being honest about it, I think we must admit that the great majority will not. So let us say that these rules exist because of the anxiety
of (lay) influence over the work that lawyers do for clients.
Anxiety is a legitimate starting point for rulemaking because it is often the product of experience and our understanding of human nature.
Nevertheless, anxiety has its limits as a guide. It cannot tell us much
about how to actually draft a rule. Reason and logic must perform that
function. Here, reason and logic have presented us with several options.
We could, for example, have attempted to articulate nuanced and precisely drawn rules to address our anxiety of influence. These rules might
have categorically forbidden certain specific practice arrangements because they created a risk of misconduct that was simply too great to tolerate when measured against the benefits we might have expected the
arrangements to offer. Elsewhere, su ppressing our anxiety, we might
have chosen cautionary language or required precautionary structures,
in lieu of categorical prohibitions. As it happens, we have used both
tools, opting for categorical prohibitions but with notable exceptions.
The exceptions, however, are few. By and large, we have eschewed finetuning and have preferred broad and absolute prohibitions.
I identified three prohibitions in the PDZR category. Let’s call them
the “three nos.” They forbid a lawyer (1) to offer legal services to third
persons through a nonlaw entity operating for-profit, (2) to permit nonlawyers to have equity (or even managerial) interests in a law firm, and
(3) to share legal fees with a lay person. Preliminarily, let us recognize
that each of these may not repr esent an equal threat to a lawyer’s independence. Take the first two. Where a law firm has a smattering of accountants, lobbyists, economists, physicians, scientists, or engineers as
equity partic ipants, but whose owners are mostly lawyers, the risk that
the non-lawyer minority will be able to induce its lawyer colleagues to
behave badly is not as serious as the risk that may be perceived if a few
lawyers are employed by a business that sells its services to third persons
at a profit.20 This is partly because, in the latter situation, the ratio of
17. See R ULE 5.4 (restricting the ability of lawyers to share legal fees with non lawyers or to
practice law with nonlawyers); 5.5(b) (forbidding lawyers to aid the un authorized practice of
law).
18. See R ULE 5.4.
19. This is usually expressed in the affirmative, as an effort to protect the lawyer’s profe ssional independence of judgment. See R ULE 5.4 & cmt.
20. This is a purpose we assume some critical number of lay people to have or we would
not be having this discussion.
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lawyers to lay persons is smaller, making it easier for the dominant
group to abuse the lawyers. But this situation is not so simple. At one
extreme, we might envision lay entrepreneurs who open a chain of legal
clinics in corporate form, such as a “lay Jacoby & Meyers,” if you will,
where the lay interest is solely an investment interest and the lay investors themselves neither provide services to clients, nor even encounter
the clients of the business. Of a different order, the threat of lay oppression should loom considerably smaller when a firm of one thousand accountants takes on one hundred lawyers, so it can provide blended accounting-law services to firm clients.
Pause here to acknowledge a remarkable fact. In a society that allows
nonlawyers to occupy other positions demanding great probity, including positions of high fiduciary responsibility and public trust in gover nment and in powerful financial institutions, suspicion of lay influence is
a curious and perhaps even an im polite justification for a broad and
nearly absolute prohibition. It becomes more than merely curious, however, when we acknowledge, as we must, that the prohibition can have a
significant affect on the cost and availability of legal services and the efficiency with which they are distributed.
II.

E XCEPTIONS TO ANXIETY

As it happens, and despite the several categorical prohibitions, anxiety over a lay person’s interference with a lawyer’s indepen dence and
judgment appears to disappear, or at least dramatically recede, in at
least four circumstances. In each, the risk of lay influence is tolerated.
The circumstances are telling.
First, Model Rule 5.4 itself, after stating its prohibition against sharing legal fees with a nonlawyer, creates an exception that allows “a lawyer or law firm [to] include non-lawyer employees in a compensation or
retirement plan, even though the plan is based in whole or in part on a
profit-sharing arrangement.”21 Consider the implications of Model Rule
5.4. Non-lawyer employees of a law firm or all firm employees, for that
matter, can now have the entirety of their compensation tied to the
firm’s profits, so long as the compensation is not tied to results in any
particular matter.22 Perhaps this does not derogate very much from the
postulate of separate spheres and perhaps it should not be seen to create
a great risk of lay interference, although both propositions are debatable.
Equally important, this exception gives law firms, as business enterprises, a valuable tool to use in configuring employee compensation
schemes. So it is a salutary exception serving a benevolent purpose. For
my purposes, however, the important fact is that we have an exception at
all, one that is quite elastic.
Moving to my second exception, Model Rules 1.8(f) and 5.4(c) allow a
lawyer to accept payment from one person to represent another so long
as “there is no interference with the lawyer’s independence of profes21. R ULE 5.4(a)(3) (emphasis added).
22. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Ops. 356 (1988)
and 1440 (1979); see also N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n on Professional and Judicial Eth ics, Op. 95-11
(1995); Va. State Bar Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 885 (1987).
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sional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship.”23 In other words,
we let the lawyer take the money and trust her not to let its source, which
is generally lay, lead her astray. A caution is the substitute for an absolute prohibition.
My third exception is ABA Opinion 355, which goes through amusing
gyrations to reach the conclusion, entirely beneficial though it may be,
that a lawyer may accept referrals and fees from sponsors of for-profit
legal service plans, whose “subscribers” then become the lawyer’s clients.24 The lawyer is told to exercise “independent professional judgment,” protect the client’s confidences, and avoid conflicts of interest.25
In the most creative part of its analysis, the Opinion concludes that although the lawyer and the plan sponsor each receive a portion of the
“modest monthly charge” that “subscribers” pay the plan, this division is
not the “fee sharing” that Rule 5.4 forbids. It is not fee sharing for two
reasons. First, tracing the direction of money flow in this arrangement,
the Opinion tells us that “the plan sponsor is compensating the lawyer;
the lawyer is not compensating the plan.”26 I hope we all recognize that
distinction as the kind of formalism that ignores the policies that pu rportedly animate the rule against feesplitting. Second, we are reminded
that a reason for the rule against feesharing is “to avoid the possibility of
a non-lawyer being able to interfere with the exercise of a lawyer’s independent professional judgment in representing a client.”27 That risk was
not present in the situation before the ABA Committee, however, because the Opinion says that “the independence of the lawyer’s professional judgment and client confidentiality must be assured in accordance
with [stated] guidelines.”28 In other words, once again, the danger of lay
influence that is elsewhere preclusive is here eliminated through the less
drastic remedy of telling lawyers to avoid it.
Opinion 355 does have its limits though. It cautions:
To the extent that the participating lawyer or law firm’s practice is
exclusively or predominantly dependent upon the plan, the issue of
assuring the independence of the lawyer’s professional judgment becomes more serious. It is, of course, a question of fact as to whether
the lawyer’s financial dependence upon the plan’s sponsor is so extensive that it affects the lawyer’s judgment.

The Opinion does not tell us how economically dependent on a legal
services plan a lawyer may be and yet remain on the safe side of the line.
That is “of course, a question of fact,” but in other contexts the degree of
economic dependency can be as high as one hundred percent, yet tolerable. A lawyer may work on retainer solely for one client, although that
client will then have significant power over the lawyer. True, here the
lawyer is dependent on the client himself, not a lay intermediary, but if
we are truly worried about the misdeeds that economic pressure can i m23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

R ULE 1.8(f)(2); see also R ULE 5.4(c).
See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 355 (1987).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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pel a lawyer to commit, those should include acts that harm others at the
client’s instigation as well as those that harm the client at the instigation
of third persons. Maybe we do not forbid lawyers to work on retainer for
only one client because of the practical impossibility of drafting and e nforcing a rule that forbids situations in which “the lawyer’s financial dependence upon [a single client] is so extensive that it affects the lawyer’s
judgment.”29
Yet this is the very cautionary language of Opinion 355, so we must
believe it can be enforced in the context of that opinion. In any event, a
more compelling reason to reject a rule that forbids exclusive dependency is its facial inconsistency with the fourth, and perhaps largest, exception to the harms that the PDZRs apprehend from lay intrusion. Here
the degree of economic dependency is always one hundred percent, yet
the rules regulating the legal profession trust the lawyer to behave properly. I speak about lawyers employed by corporations. Rule 1.13 accepts
the arrangement and trusts the lawyer not to allow the lay management
to interfere with her professional judgment.30 Moreover, the lawyer is
charged to monitor lay management.31 The trust displayed by our tolerance for this arrangement should not be underestimated. It is lay management, after all, that controls the terms and conditions of the lawyer’s
job, such as money, title, benefits, company car, support staff, and corner office. This control is present whether or not the lawyer even has a
job, and the allocation of interesting work. Despite all this, we let lawyers
work as their client’s employees while subject to the profound careeraffecting power of lay intermediaries whose conduct we expect lawyers
to oversee.
The Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers repeats the restrictions
and exceptions in the Model Rules. Permitted are: Em ployment by nonlaw entities like corporations with cautions about professional independence;32 third-party fee payments so long as the “lawyer’s loyalty to
the client [is not] compromised by the person paying the fee;”33 and law
firm employee participation in firm retirement plans “based in whole or
in part on a profit-sharing arrangement.”34 Forbidden are: Fee-splitting
arrangements with nonlawyers;35 non-lawyer equity or managerial
authority in law firms;36 and legal practice through a “business enterprise.”37 The Restatement’s policy justification for these rules is, again, to
protect the “professional independence of lawyers.”38 However, the Restatement acknowledges the costs of the rules the American Law Institute has chosen to restate. Perhaps with an eye to the future and to spark
discussions like the one you are now reading, a comment says this about

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
See R ULE 1.13(b),(c).
See id.
See R ESTATEMENT (T HIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 155 cmt. b (1996).
Id. at § 215.
Id. at § 11(3)(c).
See id. at § 11(3).
See id. at § 11(1).
Id. at § 11(2).
Id. at § 11 cmt. c.

1999]

AN XI E T Y O F I N F LU E N C E

129

the restrictions on lay participation in the delivery of legal services for
profit:
Such restrictions, however, impose costs. One cost is that any kind
of capital infusion that would entail granting an ownership or security
interest in the law firm itself (as distinguished from its assets) to a
non-lawyer investor is prohibited. Perhaps as much as any other constraint, such practical barr iers to infusion of capital into law firms si gnificantly limit the ability of law firms to attain what its lawyers may
consider to be a more optimal size at which to provide higher-quality
and lower-price services to clients. They may also deter law firms from
more effectively competing with established law firms and with nonlawyer organizations, such as consulting companies, investment
bankers, and accounting firms, to whom clients may turn for more
cost-effective law-related services. Further, unlike other persons in
many (but not all) occupations, lawyers are unable to realize the pr esent economic value of their reputations, which otherwise could be
obtained through sale to investors of stock or other ownership inte rest.39

So we see that our anxiety of lay interference with a lawyer’s professional judgment is tolerable under certain circumstances but categor ically forbidden in others. Keep in mind that all we are talking about is
the anxiety of interference, not the fact of it. No one argues that lawyers
should permit outsiders, including other lawyers, to compromise their
independent judgment. But discrepancy in our tolerance for the anxiety
of influence is not necessarily indefensible. We may be willing to risk lay
meddling in one situation but not another because either or both of the
following are true: (1) The risk of lay interference appears less acute in
one situation than the other; or (2) the social benefits of permitting a
lawyer to participate in one situation are greater than the benefits of
permitting the lawyer to participate in the other, making the risk acceptable.
We have a balancing test. In the balance goes the degree of danger.
We can never measure the degree of danger with precision, of course.
We can only intuit its presence based on reason and experience. Also in
the balance are any benefits of permitting a particular arrangement notwithstanding a danger of lay interference. This ingredient is similarly
unsuited to precise measurement, although perhaps empirical inquiries
will be more informative. In any event, because dangers and benefits
vary from situation to situation, we should expect that in some circumstances lay participation in the provision of legal services will be forbidden, while in other situations, it will be allowed with cautionary language. All we can expect is a rational and honest inquiry, one that is untainted by the self-interest of those who make the rules.
I want to stress this last point. If the legal profession is going to insist
on having a major or even a controlling influence on the rules that govern it, and if the courts or legislatures are going to allow it to have that
influence, both of which are true, then the profession has a moral obligation to the public. This obligation is equivalent to a lawyer’s fiduciary
39. Id.

130

FL O R ID A S T AT E U N I V E RSI T Y LA W RE V IE W

[Vol. 27:123

obligation to a client—to promote rules responsive to the public interest—which includes the legitimate interests of clients without regard to
its members’ self-interest. That responsibility has not always been honored.40
Immediately, we notice three things about the rules against feesplitting, against letting nonlawyers have equity participation in law firms,
and against letting lawyers work for business enterprises that practice
law. First, they are categorical rules. They do not allow conduct while
adding a caution. Instead, they forbid conduct entirely. Second, as far as
I can discern, this categorical treatment is not the result of an inquiry in
which the risk of lay interference with a lawyer’s judgment has been assessed and then balanced against any benefit the arrangement might
have produced. Third, and perhaps most telling, the arrangements that
are categorically forbidden pose competitive threats to the profession. In
other words, if allowed, the forbidden arrangements could turn out to
cost lawyers money, or threaten expansions that can cost lawyers money,
because they will invite com petition by persons outside the profession.
By contrast, the situations in which the rules tolerate the danger of
lay meddling (when our anxiety of influence is quelled) all carry certain
benefits for lawyers generally. I recognize that the “three nos” might
benefit some lawyers, were they allowed. However, by allowing nonlawyers to earn money in the law business, these arrangements pose a financial danger to the profession as a whole without offering a concomitant benefit, such as fees from third parties or jobs as corporation employees.
III. LAWYERS W ORKING W ITH OTHERS
Let us focus now on one arrangement in particular: permitting lawyers and nonlawyers to work together, as co-owners, of profe ssional
service entities that provide legal and other professional e xpertise to clients of the entities. I am confident that it would be po ssible to draft a
rule to alter the categorical prohibition against such alliances without
altering other rules that proscribe other alliances that are alleged to pose
too great a threat of lay intervention. However, that proof must be d eferred for other work. Since it has been much in the news lately,41 I focus
instead on the alliances between lawyers and accountants, though I
could equally well apply the remarks to alliances between lawyers and
other professionals.
It is quite clear that law firms and accounting firms can collaborate
on a single matter for a common client. As the Restatement says, the rule
does not “prohibit a law firm from cooperation with a legally separate
partnership or other organization of nonlawyers in providing multi-

40. See Stephen Gillers, What We Talked About When We Talked About Ethics: A Critical
View of the Model Rules, 46 OHIO ST . L.J. 243 (1985).
41. See, e.g., John Gibeaut & James Podgers, Feeling the Squeeze: Commission Ap pointed
to Assess Threat from Accountants, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1998, at 88; David Segal, Rivals Call Law
Firms to Account, Tax Advisors Hope To Cross a Line and Compete for Legal Clients, W ASH.
P OST , Nov. 12, 1998, at F1.
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disciplinary services to clients.” 42 Law and accounting firms must bill
separately for their work, though their charges can appear in a single
statement. That is true, according to lawyer ethics rules, even if each of
the two firms work for a contingent fee that will be paid from the same
recovery.43 While a lawyer must always exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of a client, the arrangement is legal and ethical even if the accounting firm is large and the source of a great deal of a
law firm’s business, and the law firm is small and eager to remain the
beneficiary of future referrals.
What if one of those accountants crosses the street and goes to work
at the law firm, while serving the same clients in the same way? That’s
fine so long as the accountant receives a salary that is not directly dependent on the law firm’s fees in any particular matter.44 The salary can
even be large. The problem arises, and the line is crossed, only if the accountant becomes a partner or shareholder in the law firm, even if the
ratio of lawyer to accountant is one hundred to one or greater. The risk
of lay oppression or the anxiety of influence, until now fully contained,
becomes not merely heightened but unmanageable and impermissible.45

42. R ESTATEMENT (T HIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 11 cmt. f.
43. Bar opinions recognizing that it is not unethical for a lawyer to work on a matter with
a nonlawyer or entity that is not a law firm, even where the nonlawyer or entity is receiving a
contingent fee, so long as that fee does not come from the la wyer’s fee, include: ABA Comm. on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Ops. 354 (1987) and 1445 (1985); N.Y. Bar
Ass’n, Comm. on Professional Ethics, Ops. 705 (1998) and 572 (1985) (collecting authorities);
Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tenn., Op. 85-F-101 (1985); S.C.
Bar, Op. 91-32 (1992); D.C. Bar Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 233 (1993) (supporting the proposition, even though the D.C. version of Rule 5.4 differs from the Model Rules). See also Blu menberg v. Neubecker, 191 N.E.2d 269 (N.Y. 1963) (uphold ing an arrangement whereby a lawyer and an accountant were both retained for contin gency fees through a single agreement).
44. See R ULE 5.4(d). We have seen that the accountant’s entire income can d epend on an
interest in the firm’s profits. See R ULE 5.4(a)(3).
45. I want to say a marginal word about privilege, confidentiality, and conflict of in terest.
Under traditional rules, information the client provides to the accountant or the lawyer to en able the lawyer to provide the client with legal services would ordinarily be privileged. See
United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 931 (2d Cir. 1961) (finding that attorney-client privilege
applies where an attorney consulted with an accountant for purposes of providing legal advice
to a client or where a client consults with an attorney with an accountant present); see also In
re Grand Jury Proceedings Under Seal, 947 F.2d 1188, 1191 (4th Cir. 1991) (following Kovel’s
lead and noting that attorney-client privilege protects communication between the client and
accountant to enable the accountant to assist client in employing a lawyer and when communication occurred immediately prior to meeting with the lawyer). So long as communic ations
between lawyer and client, or between either and the accountant, are for the purpose of giving
legal advice within the meaning of the Kovel doctrine, the fact that the lawyer works under the
auspices of an entity that is not a traditional law firm should not affect privilege. Lawyers employed at corporations or public interest organizations enjoy privilege. Analytically, the prerequisites for the existence of the privilege do not depend on the status of the lawyer’s employer.
See, e.g. , Rossi v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 540 N.E.2d 703 (N.Y. 1989) (recognizing privilege
for in-house lawyers).
Conflict and confidentiality issues will arise in a multidisciplinary firm that provides legal
services. Although this is not the place to delve into those issues, my view is, first, that a legal
services client of a lawyer who works under the auspices of an entity that is not a law firm, or in
a law firm that has non-lawyer partners, must, absent informed consent, receive the full panoply of protections the conflict rules afford cl ients of lawyers in traditional practices. Second,
such a lawyer should have all of the same duties of confidentiality that a client has a right to expect from a lawyer working at a traditional law firm.
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This position cannot be defended, nor has anyone made much e ffort
to defend it, at least not when the ratio of lawyer to accountant is in the
range of one hundred to one.46 Rather, the case against allowing lawyers
and accountants to join in partnership is generally couched as a “floodgates” argument. For example, Lawrence Fox testified before the ABA
Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice that allowing lawyers and accountants to work together in multidisciplinary firms “will destroy the
legal profession’s ‘core values.’”47 One wonders how he can know. A few
years earlier, Mr. Fox was similarly pessimistic about the future of the
profession if law firms were permitted to operate businesses that offered
clients and others ancillary legal services, as Rule 5.7, with cautions, now
allows. Fox wrote then:
[T]he ancillary business movement introduces non-lawyers into positions of influence and control of the profession. All the safeguards one
can imagine do not overcome the reality that those who come to
prominence and success in the operations of the ancillary business
will end up with real power in the governance of the overall enter prise.48

All lawyers make floodgate arguments. “If you change the rule to allow
this behavior (or to forbid it), the next thing that will happen is . . . .” I do
not take the time to rebut a floodgates argument here, except to say that
I am confident that any adjustment in the rule that now forbids lawyeraccountant alliances or alliances between lawyers and other professionals could be drafted in a way that would not open the floodgates, but
rather contain them. Language is both flexible and precise enough to accomplish that goal.
I do, however, want to raise one modest variation on the floodgates
argument. If the rule were changed to let accountants have equity interests in law firms, where the balance of power would favor lawyers,
should the rule also be changed to let lawyers work at accounting firms,
whether as employees or co-owners, if their work included the rendition
of legal services to clients of the accounting firm? In other words, assume the one hundred to one ratio were inverted, one hundred accountants to one lawyer. Thus, is the risk of oppression great enough to suppress the arrangement whatever its benefit? No one can claim that the
risks are the same whether the ratio is one hundred to one or one to one
hundred. But is it great enough when the lawyer stands alone to ban the

46. The District of Columbia is the only American jurisdiction that permits nonlawyers to
share legal fees with lawyers. The entity providing legal services must have law practice “as its
sole purpose;” both lawyers and nonlawyers must “abide by” the Rules of Professional Conduct;
the lawyers must be responsible for the “non-lawyer participants to the same extent as if nonlawyer participants were lawyers under Rule 5.1;” and these “conditions [must be] set forth in
writing.” D.C. R ULE 5.4(b). The two aspects of this provision worth noting are that it does not
require that lawyers have voting control over the en tity, but that it does require that the entity’s
sole purpose be the provision of legal services to clients. This latter requirement makes it un likely that nonlawyers would outnumber lawyers as owners or managers of the en tity.
47. Direction of Legal Profession is Debated at Multidisciplinary Practice Panel Hea rings,
in LAWYER’ S MANUAL ON P ROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 45 (ABA/BNA eds., 1999).
48. Lawrence Fox, Restraint Is Good In Trade, NAT’L L.J. , Apr. 29, 1991, at 17. This prediction has not come true.
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arrangement entirely, no matter what the benefit and with no empirical
support? My position is that it is not great enough. I offer six arguments
to that effect.
IV.

W HY THE P ROHIBITION IS W RONG

First, the arrangement is analogous to the situation in which a lawyer
employed by a corporation is directed by the employer’s lay officers. The
parallels are strong. In both situations, the nonlawyer and the lawyer
have duties to the same client. The corporate officer has fiduciary obligations to the entity client as does the corporate lawyer.49 Similarly, the
accountant is responsible to the same client as the lawyer and may have
professional and fiduciary duties to it.50 The ratio of lawyer to lay person
can be the same in either situation. Pari passu , should we not assume
that the danger to the client is appreciably no different in one instance
than the other?
My second argument in favor of letting lawyers and other professionals, here accountants, associate in one entity to deliver blended services
is the fact that the accountants are not simply treating legal services as a
product they purchase wholesale and sell retail. They are not mere traders or passive investors. Rather, the accountants are separately delivering services to firm clients—their firm’s clients—whose custom they will
wish to retain. The accountants are professionally and personally i nvested in the enterprise. This reduces the risk that they will betray a cl ient or cause the lawyer to do so.
My third argument is that the joint arrangement is intuitively beneficial. It gives clients a choice between receiving a mixture of services from
one entity or purchasing the constituent services from each of several
entities. Often, clients who will choose to use a multidisciplinary firm
rather than separate firms will be sophisticated cl ients who know how to
shop for professional advice.
Fourth, the lawyer who works with other professionals in this way
continues to be bound by the ethical obligations of his or her licensing
jurisdiction. A novel practice environment does not eliminate that co nstraint. A fifth and related argument, which will sometimes be true, is
that the other professionals will, like the lawyer, enjoy a state-granted license or credential that misconduct will jeopardize.51
Finally, we do have experience with this sort of arrangement if in a
somewhat different context. Supreme Court decisions have forced states
to permit lawyers to work for nonprofit (or public interest) organizations
49. See R ESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §1 (1958).
50. See, e.g. , Claire Murray, Inc. v. Reed, 656 A.2d 822 (N.H. 1995); Gemstar Ltd. v. Ernst
& Young, 917 P.2d 222 (Ariz. 1996). Even if the business is structured as a professional corporation or other limited liability entity, so that accountants will not, merely by virtue of their
ownership interest, be liable for breach of a lawyer’s fiduciary duty to a client, accountants and
others will remain liable to clients for their own misconduct. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. Corp. Ann.
§1505(a) (West 1986).
51. Written testimony of Professor Linda Galler before ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (Nov. 13, 1998) (“Each of the fifty states, the District of Columbia, Guam,
Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, has enacted accountancy laws governing the licensing
of professional accountants.”).
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that are not traditional law firms, where the employed lawyers are under
the control of lay officers and boards, yet represent third parties, not the
organization itself.52 Other Supreme Court decisions permit lawyers to
work for union members under plans that envision an intermediary role
for the union between lawyer and client.53 For example, the union may
be the employer of the lawyer 54 or it may have negotiated lower rates for
its members in exchange for a promise of referral.55 D espite fears,56 neither arrangement has proved unacceptable. We expect and trust that the
lay participants will respect the lawyer’s professional obligations. Similarly, ABA Opinion 355 itself permits lawyers to represent “subscribers”
of for-profit legal service plans, although a lay influence (the plan sponsor) is an intermediary in the delivery of the legal service and the source
of much, most, or perhaps even all of the lawyer’s income.
These arguments are based on analogy or on judgment and experience. They cannot, of course, prove a particular level of risk with
mathematical certainty. That’s impossible. But I suggest that they are
strong arguments, indeed that they are irrefutable for the particular
situation under discussion. Of two possible opposing arg uments, one is
unacceptable and the other is wrong. The unacceptable argument is that
the change would reduce the amount of money from the sale of legal
services that stays within the profession. I assume it might, although
there may be some compensating benefits even to the wealth of lawyers.
Still, it is true that nonlawyers would be earning money from the work of
lawyers or, more accurately, from entities that sell the services of both
lawyers and nonlawyers. But this is not a consideration worthy of the
bar. Acquiring fees cannot be the basis for an ethical rule.
The second argument against multidisciplinary firms is that even if a
change to the extent described would produce no harm, or at least no
harm that we do not risk in other situations, a rule change will permit no
stopping place. Once we let lay people participate as owners or managers
of for-profit entities that provide legal services to third persons in one
situation, the argument runs, we will have to allow it in all situations. We
will, for example, see lay investors starting law firms. Shares of American law firms will trade over the counter. This is the floodgates arg ument, no longer the anxiety of influence, but the nightmare of influence.
This is not the place, as I have said, to draft the language of the rule that
should gently wake us from the nightmare, but I have no doubt that a
rule can be written that will enable courts and the bar to make the necessary distinctions. The burden on the profession now is to begin to make
them.

52.
53.
54.
(1967).
55.
56.

See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 441 (1963).
See, e.g., United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576, 586 (1971).
See United Mine Workers, District 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217, 223
See United Transp., 401 U.S. at 586.
See id. (Harlan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).

